“We Were Helping Them to Anticipate and Shape the Future”

Joshua Pollock at ArmsControlWonk.com has pointed today to a lecture by Thomas Fingar, former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, which was given at Stanford University on October 21 where he provides insights as to how the Intelligence Community, by declassifying minor parts of the classified 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (NIE) may have manipulated lawmakers for the sake of drawing the ‘right’ conclusions and act accordingly.

It comes somehow as a surprise (even for Pollock) that “the White House [had] instructed the Intelligence Community to release an unclassified version of the report’s key judgments but declined to take responsibility for ordering its release.” (Emphasis added.)

“Critics on the right and the left denounced or praised the report as a deliberate effort by the Intelligence Community – or, in many of the commentaries, by me – to derail administration plans to attack Iran. That, too, is a story for another day.

“What I want to do here is to take advantage of the fact that a small portion of the estimate was declassified (3 of about 100 pages with none of the almost 1500 source citations) making it possible for me to talk about it in public.”

But an attack of Iran in late 2007 had been imminent. Seymour Hersh has had reported already one year before on the results of C.I.A. activities which were perceived in the White House with hostility. He wrote in The New Yorker on November 27, 2006:

“The Administration’s planning for a military attack on Iran was made far more complicated earlier this fall by a highly classified draft assessment by the C.I.A. challenging the White House’s assumptions about how close Iran might be to building a nuclear bomb. The C.I.A. found no conclusive evidence, as yet, of a secret Iranian nuclear-weapons program running parallel to the civilian operations that Iran has declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency. (The C.I.A. declined to comment on this story.)

“The C.I.A.’s analysis, which has been circulated to other agencies for comment, was based on technical intelligence collected by overhead satellites, and on other empirical evidence, such as measurements of the radioactivity of water samples and smoke plumes from factories and power plants. Additional data have been gathered, intelligence sources told me, by high-tech (and highly classified) radioactivity-detection devices that clandestine American and Israeli agents placed near suspected nuclear-weapons facilities inside Iran in the past year or so. No significant amounts of radioactivity were found.

“A current senior intelligence official confirmed the existence of the C.I.A. analysis, and told me that the White House had been hostile to it.”

It has also been reported that Vice President Dick Cheney had been outrageous when parts of the 2007 NIE were actually declassified and the public learned that Iranian had, with some confidence, not resumed their military nuclear program since 2003.

Most commentators intuitively understood the NIE’s main message that, if Iran had once found it reasonable, under its ‘reform’ president Mohammad Khatami, to halt, in response to international pressure, an existing, nuclear weapons program, diplomacy was still a valid option in 2007. In addition Fingar, in his lecture, makes the point that the NIE had also the timeline in mind, as to when Iran resumes, if it wants, the fabrication of a nuclear weapon. In the NIE, that date had been moved from late 2009 to “sometime during the 2010-2015 timeframe.” (In an updated testimony to Congress, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair has further postponed the date to “not before 2013.”)

“The declassified portion of the (2007) estimate did not address how long it would take Iran to convert highly enriched uranium into a weapon but the classified text did.”

Who will get the classified version of intelligence information, which might lead to war, and who (lawmakers, the public) is put off with the declassified part is a sensitive issue. The declassified part of the 2007 NIE on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities has, so far, at least prevented another war in the Middle East with most probably disastrous consequences not only for the region which, as everybody knows, is a tinderbox. In that context, those who have decided to release it might have deserved the Nobel Peace Prize more than anybody else.

Fingar closes with an either naïve or cynical, anyway irrational, confidence of serving the good guys in a complicated world, beyond any democracy.

“How those judgments (in the NIE’s declassified portion) could be construed as dismissing the idea that Iranian nuclear activities were a major problem continues to mystify me, but the point I want to make here is that, in addition to many other things, the NIE gave policymakers a timeline, a sense of urgency, and possible alternative ways to address the problem. We were helping them to anticipate and shape the future.”

The Same Old Tricks

The widely perceived new crisis about Iran’s nuclear program has a pretty complicated history. Several Iranian lawmakers and even defeated presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi have vehemently rejected a UN brokered deal according to which Iran should send 1200 kg of its low enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia for further enrichment and later to France for refinement.

In order to produce radio isotopes for medical purposes, such as Technetium-99m, medium enriched uranium has been fuelled into the 5 MW research reactor in Tehran for years, which has been supplied by the United States more than 40 years ago. Iran had purchased in 1988 about 116 kg of medium enriched uranium at 19.75% from Argentina, and this amount has been delivered to Iran by 1993. According to some calculations Iran would be running out this fuel by late 2010. Early in June 2009, Iran’s envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Ali-Asgar Soltaniyeh had sent an inquiry to outgoing Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei seeking to replace this supply.

Soltaniyeh’s letter to the IAEA of June 2 has obviously extensively been discussed in the October 1 Geneva talks by the P5+1 and Iran, both in plenary sessions and face-to-face talks. At least the Iranian delegation led by its chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili seemed to have accepted that most of its LEU stockpile would be send to Russia for further enrichment after which France would provide Iran with the refined fuel.

The Geneva talks have been described as largely open, professional, even constructive. That the U.S. and Iran achieved almost a deal in an allegedly first encounter since the 444-day American Embassy hostage crisis of 1979-1981 (which will be commemorated next week on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean with contradictory sentiments) was a true sensation. But one cannot disregard the current legitimacy crisis of Iran’s leaders after the catastrophic presidential election only four months ago; and the ever diverging opinions among the establishment. Tehran has definitely a couple of other options for consideration.

First, the country could enrich its so far produced LEU by simply reintroducing it into the centrifuges in Natanz. Soltaniyeh’s inquiry letter to ElBaradei contained most probably already such a suggestion, although even Tehran would consider it unrealistic that the IAEA would allow the country to step up their enrichment program for medical purposes. Most countries are already afraid of Iran’s enrichment program resulting possibly in a nuclear bomb. There have also been reports on contamination problems of the so far produced LEU with molybdenum hexafluoride which might put the centrifuges in Natanz at risk if used for further enrichment. However, while so far the country has failed in certain areas, it definitely tries hard to master the full nuclear cycle. These kinds of technical problems may indeed be solved soon.

Second, under the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Iran is a signatory of since 1968, the country has actually the right to simply buy the stuff for medical reasons even under current UNSC resolution 1737.

And third, Iran may even reconsider its inquiry and shut down for the time being the more than 40 years old research reactor in Tehran after running out the Argentine medium enriched uranium. Tehran may consider producing radio isotopes for medical purposes easier and in much larger amounts in the heavy water reactor at Arak which might be operational soon.

In fact, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA Ali-Asgar Soltaniyeh went to the Vienna talks which started on October 19 not with one, apparently unprofitable, option for Iran only; namely sending almost all LEU abroad. Given the bad reputation of French negotiators in nuclear issues in particular when it comes to Iran, all of the above three alternatives may have discussed already then. Why ElBaradei so much hurried with his deal which would put Iran in a position where it could easily be blackmailed by western powers may have something to do with his soon retirement. But Iran has got some experience in recent decades of not being fleeced at the end of the day.

It has certainly been a ‘golden opportunity’ of getting rid of Iran’s nuclear stuff, but the French, American and Russian delegation has not really succeeded in confidence building. It is hoped anyway that the talks will continue on a par with Iran.

Visiting Qom

 

 

Inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are now visiting the recently disclosed new uranium enrichment facility near Qom in Iran. Some commentators have raised concern that Iran would have had more than a month, after having notified the IAEA on September 21 about the site, to remove any incriminating evidence that the site has already been in an advanced stage of construction.  

Iran’s disclosure of the site came only after it had become clear that western intelligence had got knowledge about it for some time. GlobalSecurity.org  has published satellite imagery of January 2009 by DigitalGlobal which shows somehow disturbing construction work of an apparently heavily fortified facility already done. The UN inspectors will soon report on their findings to the IAEA headquarters in Vienna. ElBaradei’s next and probably final report on Iran (he will retire in December) is due next month.

Dealing with Iran

 

 

Earlier this month Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and his delegation had suggested, in the long-awaited Geneva talks, an unexpected deal with the West regarding shipping much of its so far produced stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia for further enrichment to about 20%. It should then been returned to Iran in order to fuel Tehran’s research reactor for the production of medical isotopes. Many commentators were just surprised about completely new perspectives of international collaboration with the decade-long isolated pariah state. Possible motivations for Tehran’s seemingly constructive turn were quickly analyzed. Severe contamination of LEU, which had been produced in Natanz, with molybdenum had been identified as a major problem for further uranium enrichment at that site. But if Iran actually wants to master the full nuclear fuel cycle, reprocessing LEU in Esfahan’s uranium conversion facility should not be regarded a serious obstacle.

After further talks at the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Iran has missed in the meantime a deadline, set by the outgoing IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, of responding to a proposal which suggested that most of Iran’s LEU is exported to Russia and France. The issue is delicate, and Ali Ashgar Soltaniyeh, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, has definitely to get approval in Tehran which has signaled already that the country prefers to simply purchase the needed uranium for the research reactor from Russia. Soltaniyeh has promised to provide the IAEA with a final answer next week.

There are definitely heavy disputes within the complicated ruling hierarchy, in particular when considering the tremendous emphasis the possibly illegitimate President Ahmadinejad has given to Iran’s nuclear program in the past, which has allegedly only peaceful purposes. The proposed UN deal which has been agreed already by the US, France and Russia may there be regarded as lopsided debilitation of Tehran’s position; and a hastily set deadline by ElBaradei might have been a grave diplomatic mistake, indeed. Iranian delegations are usually competent chess players who easily rumble intentions of their western counterparts.

At the same time, IAEA inspectors are right now underway for a visit of the newly disclosed enrichment site near Qom which has been revealed to the public only last month, first in a letter by Iran to the IAEA dated September 21 and a couple of days later during a press conference by President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Gordon Brown and President Nicolas Sarkozy in Pittsburgh at the G20 meeting. It is not clear whether the past few weeks had enabled Iran to remove revealing evidence that the site has already been operational. Some commentators have pitied that the West has not insisted on immediate inspections after the site had been made public.

There is fear that mutual trust and confidence building has come to an end already. Iran’s illegitimate government, in particular its hard-line president, may be in need of keeping the country in its pariah state, sad to say.

Terrorist Organizations

Yesterday’s suicide attack in Sistan-Baluchestan with so far 42 casualties has been conducted most probably by Abdul Malek Rigi’s Jundullah, or Soldiers of Allah, a Sunni terrorist organization related to Al Qaeda which had been founded in 2003 and which is operating in Iran’s southeastern province. Rigi himself is supposed to be located in Pakistan, and Iran has accused, in the meantime, Pakistan of indirectly support him and Jundullah. Rigi has given, on April 2, 2007, a telephone interview to Voice of America (VOA), which has subsequently heavily been criticized by Tehran of giving terrorists a voice. Another interview of Rigi was aired by Al Arabiya TV on October 17, 2008.

Besides giving interviews to western or western-related broadcasting services, Rigi is also shown in a graphic video beheading a person, which has been aired by Iranian presstv last summer. Juan Cole has posted it today on his blog.

It should not be forgotten that former U.S. president G. W. Bush, even during last year’s election campaign, has managed to get 400 million dollars granted by Congress for regime change in Iran. Seymour Hersh, in an article in The New Yorker on July 7, 2008, had listed the possible beneficiaries: the Kurdish separatist party PJAK; Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), until recently considered even in the U.S. a terrorist organization; and Jundullah.

That Iran wants to blame today also U.S (and U.K.) intelligence services for the blast which caused the death of six high-ranked pasdaran officers, may thus have a reason.

Resuming the Talks

When on Monday next week delegations of Iran and world powers resume their talks in Vienna, the previous three weeks have seen much clarification already. Iran’s offer (or request) to further enrich most of its 1500 kg of 3.5% or so low enriched uranium (LEU) with the help of Russia or France to the desired 19.75% (for fueling the Tehran’s research reactor which is entirely used for producing the medical isotope technetium 99) has come by many as a surprise.

One reason for Iran’s turn may be contamination of the UF₆ with molybdenum which could damage the centrifuges in Natanz if it is further enriched. Joshua Pollack at ArmsControlWonk.com points to the long-known facts today that the contamination has its origin in Esfahan’s Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF). Only early in 2007 centrifuges in Natanz have been fed by UF₆, which had been produced in Esfahan, then leading to the contamination problem. Before, they relied on stuff which had been delivered by China.

According to Pollack, purification of contaminated LEU is not really a problem for the Iranians. The material has only to be transported back to Esfahan, re-processed and returned to Natanz. Tehran has, therefore, already stressed that, given the Vienna talks failed or did not yield, for Iran, constructive results one would definitely go ahead with enriching in the country. One should not underestimate Tehran’s first aim: mastering the entire nuclear fuel cycle.

Given Iran’s bad experience with western collaboration for decades, becoming independent of external sources may be of utmost importance for the country. Western powers may be well-advised of eventually building trust and confidence in offering honest and constructive international cooperation. So are the rulers in Tehran.

Geneva Talks

The talks of the five world powers and Germany (P5+1) and Iran will resume on October 19. One surprising result of the October 1 talks for the public was that Iran would probably be willing of letting Russia further enrich its low enriched uranium (LEU) from around 3.5-4% to 19.75%. Enrichment to this concentration is necessary for producing isotopes for medical purposes, specifically 99mTc, or technetium; this will be done in a small research reactor in Tehran (TRR). Most (if not all, as has been estimated by Geoffrey Forden at armscontrolwonk.com) of Iran’s stockpile of LEU would so get out of the country.

When US envoy Undersecretary of State William Burns briefed the White House on the talks, he revealed that Iran had contacted some time ago the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for solving its apparent problems. On the TRR, Burns explains:

“This is a research reactor which has been in operation in Tehran for decades, producing medical isotopes under strict IAEA safeguards. The last supply of fuel for this reactor, which is at roughly 19.75 percent LEU, was supplied by the Argentine government in the early 1990s and it’s going to run out in roughly the next year, year and a half.

Iran came to the IAEA a few months ago with the request to replace this supply. The IAEA consulted us and some others, some other members, and to make a long story short the United States and Russia joined together in a proposal to the IAEA which the IAEA subsequently conveyed as a response to the Iranians, to use Iran’s own LEU stockpile as the basis, as the feedstock for the reactor fuel that’s required.

This would then entail taking its LEU, which is enriched to about 3.5 percent, enriching it up to 19.75 percent in Russia, which the Russians have now publicly confirmed that they’re prepared to do, and then fabricating that into fuel assemblies which can be used at this safeguarded reactor, and the French have now confirmed their willingness to play that last role. Those are the basic details involved in the proposal. The potential advantage of this, if it’s implemented, is that it would significantly reduce Iran’s LEU stockpile which itself is a source of anxiety in the Middle East and elsewhere.

During our talks today the Iranians agreed to accept this proposal in principle, and there’s to be a meeting in Vienna on the 18^th of October, led by IAEA experts, to try to work out the details.”

According to Burns, the talks were direct and candid. He concludes that, “the significance of today was that Iran, having refused to talk about its nuclear program since July of 2008, engaged on that program today with the United States as a full participant. … [N]o one expected that one day would allow us to resolve international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, but I think today was a first step in what is bound to be a difficult process.”

As the Ambassador to the IAEA Ali Ashgar Soltanieh admitted today in an interview with BBC’s Stephen Sackur on HARDtalk, Iran’s recently revealed second uranium enrichment site near Qom has been planned for contingency reasons after massive threats especially in 2007 by the Bush-Cheney administration and Israel to bomb the enrichment Natanz which is safeguarded by IAEA. Even if one has to admit that Iran’s nuclear ambitions have never been transparent (which is hoped to change soon), this is only another example for counterproductive politics avoiding or even fearing diplomacy but rather go for war.

IAEA Estimates

Last month, a couple of days before Tehran had to admit the existence of a so far clandestine new nuclear site near Qom, I had expressed my concerns about the release of declassified information on Iran’s controversially disputed nuclear program while, at the same time, rumors are spread that classified parts, for example of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) may state something else. The declassified part of the NIE had claimed that Iran has, with moderate confidence, not resumed its military nuclear program which has, with high confidence, existed since 2003.

In their recent report on Iran, which has been derestricted September 9, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) again pointed at length to a possible military dimension of Iran’s nuclear program. The Agency has been accused, in particular by France and Israel, that a draft document, dealing with respective allegations has not been included in the official report. On Friday last week, certain excerpts of a lengthy document leaked and were immediately posted on the web page of the Institute for Scientific Information and Security (ISIS).

The news (if they are new; most of the so-called Alleged Studies are related to the infamous laptop which has been smuggled out of the country by the wife of an Iranian, who had been recruited by a German intelligence service; its content has become public in 2005 but was regarded faked by Tehran) may indeed be worrying. According to the excerpts of the circulating, though not approved, documents, the IAEA has gathered information that the Ministry of Defense of Iran has conducted and still may be conducting a comprehensive program aimed at the development of a nuclear payload for the Shahab 3 missile (one immediately remembers the provocative tests by Iran a few days before the Geneva talks). As mentioned already in the concluding remarks of the previous IAEA report on Iran, this information seems to be generally consistent since it originates from several Member States (of the NPT) and the IAEA’s own investigations.  The leaked paper says, inter alia:

“From the documents presented by a number of Member States and the Agency’s own activities, it is possible to assess that in early 2002 Iran formally declared the start of its warhead development programme, which very likely comprised at least two projects under the leadership and auspices of the Ministry of Defence – Project 111 and Project 110. Project 111 was to design the inner cone of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle and the production of an explosives operation control set (ECS). Project 110 was to produce the contents of the spherical warhead payload. The Agency assesses that the development work to design a suitable chamber inside the re-entry vehicle is intended to accommodate a new warhead payload that is quite likely to be nuclear.

“Information received from a Member State indicates a round, semi-round and semi-sperical shock generator for which an EBW (exploding bridge wire) detonator is being developed. It is said that the shock generator was fired in field test conditions with one detonator using a firing cable.

“The significance of the information is that Iran may have developed an effective high explosive implosion system, which could be contained within a payload container believed to be small enough to fit into the re-entry body chamber of the Shahab 3 missile.

“It is believed that Iran has developed exploding bridgewire detonators and associated electronic high voltage firing systems. The Agency assesses that Iran has managed to develop a high explosive industry capable of synthesizing and formulating the raw materials into explosive compositions and that could be used in a nuclear weapon. It is very likely that Iran has the required engineering skills to machine explosives into the weapon components. It is assessed that Iran has succeeded in combining its detonator development work with other related studies to manufacture a relatively compact high explosives initiation system that has probably been tested with comprehensive diagnostic equipment.”

According to this leaked information, the IAEA assesses that Iran has sufficient information to design and build a crude nuclear weapon.

“The Agency assesses that Iran has conducted studies relating to the aspects necessary to incorporate a device into a conventional delivery system such as the Shahab 3 missile. Further studies on payload integration are also accompanied by the electronic engineering studies to produce an arming and fuzing system. From the evidence presented to the Agency it is possible to suggest that, for the Shahab 3 delivery system, Iran has conducted R&D (research and development) into producing a prototype system. However, further work is necessary to manufacture a more robust unit capable of producing an airburst fuzing option that would function both safely and reliably.

“Overall the Agency does not believe that Iran has yet achieved the means of integrating a nuclear payload into the Shahab 3 missile with any confidence that it would work. Nonetheless, with further effort it is likely that Iran will overcome problems and confidence will be built up.”

Thus, the leaked excerpts conclude with a sense of grim humor. Reading this makes immediately clear why the official IAEA report of August 27 does not further entertain such speculations which seem to be irrelevant as long as the 2007 NIE has not been undergone a thorough revision. This revision may be overdue, since British, German, and, of course Israeli intelligence comes to different conclusions about the existence of a military nuclear program in Iran.

The leakage may highlight a tough power struggle within the IAEA between the Department of Safeguards which has drafted the respective paper and the Department of External Relations and Policy Coordination. Outgoing Director General ElBaradei might favor the stance of the latter. It is noteworthy that the leakage to ISIS (most probably via Olli Heinonen, the Director General’s Deputy for Safeguards) has just happened when ElBaradei had left Vienna for visiting the rulers in Tehran for scheduling a first IAEA inspection of the Qom site.

Qom

The suspected new nuclear site (Fig. 1) near Qom is located about 9 km southeast of Daryacheh-ye Howz-e Soltan, a pretty circular salt pan with an eight-km diameter; and 25 km northeast to the outskirts of Iran’s holy city of Qom. The site on the northeastern foothills of a small mountain ridge seems to be rather small. Satellite imagery from Google Earth (of March 2005) shows two buildings, probably tunnel entrances and some earth rubble, probably from tunnel excavations.

In the meantime, new satellite imagery by DigitalGlobe of September 2009 (Fig. 2) provides evidence for considerable construction activity. A comparison of the new site with that located between Kashan and Natanz, about 150 km southeast, shows the difference in sizes (Fig. 3). While much of it is in fact underground, the visible parts of the Natanz uranium enrichment facility (in fact easily visible from the nearby highway to Esfahan) are heavily fortified. It covers an area of about four square kilometers.

Fig. 1 Google Earth satellite imagery indicates (a) Iran; (b) Central Iran with the huge Daryacheh-ye Namak (the triangular white spot) and the smaller circular Daryacheh-ye Howz-e Soltan in the center of the image; (c) Daryacheh-ye Howz-e Soltan embedded in mountain ridges at the outskirts of Dasht-e Kavir, Iran’s Great Salt Desert; (d) the suspected new nuclear site (the bar corresponds to 10 km); (e) the site in 2005 (the bar corresponds to 100 m).

Fig. 2 Recent satellite imagery of the suspected new nuclear site near Qom.

 

Fig. 3 Differences in sizes of the suspected new nuclear site near Qom (a) and the uranium enrichment facility near Natanz (b). The bar corresponds to 1 km.

 

Well-prepared Iranians

That the Iranian delegation in Geneva in their long-awaited talks with World powers P5+1 would announce IAEA inspections of its second enrichment facility at Qom, which had been revealed only last week, within a couple of months had been expected. That Iran suggested further enrichment to 20% of already produced LEU, or low enriched uranium of about 4%, for fueling into its research reactor in Tehran for the production of medical isotopes in Russia had not. The chief negotiator Saeed Jalili discussed Iran’s diplomatic package of September 10 but was also offering so far completely considered impossible concessions regarding its highly disputed nuclear ambitions.

Middle-East expert Juan Cole claims that “Barack Obama pwned Bush-Cheney in one day, and got more concessions from Iran in 7 1/2 hours than the former administration got in 8 years of saber-rattling.” It’s not Obama. I suppose, it’s the well-prepared Iranian delegation which made it. It is an important step of confidence-building. There will be further talks later this month. We’ll see whether reason prevails or the regime’s hardliners are able to counteract.