To whom should he send it? The main question is not what is said in the letter but whether Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will convey it to the people of Iran. Obviously, Obama wants to address them in the first place. Although he seem to make clear that regime change is no longer an option, the Iranians should compare their “relatively low standard of living with that of some more prosperous neighbors and contemplate the benefits of losing its pariah status in the west,” as the Guardian wrote yesterday.

But is that the way to win more sympathy for the US (plenty of which is already there)? “Although the tone is conciliatory, it also calls on Iran to end what the US calls state sponsorship of terrorism.” The Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad demands, in the meantime, an apology to the Iranian people for “the crimes they (the US) have committed against us” referring to the CIA coup d’état in 1953 (“Operation Ajax”) when the democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq (the first and last of its kind) had been toppled and the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi re-instituted.  

He also mentioned the 1988 shooting down of the Iranian passenger Airbus A300 by the US Navy’s guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes over the Persian Gulf. Two-hundred and ninety Iranian passengers died. In contrast to the former (Madeleine Albright in fact apologized for Operation Ajax in 2000), the US never apologized for the latter (although, in 1996, both countries reached “an agreement in full and final settlement of all disputes, differences, claims, counterclaims” relating to the incident at the International Court of Justice. As part of the settlement, the US agreed to pay $61.8 million in compensation for the Iranians killed).

It is hoped that Iran is about to apologize as well, for example for its 444 days siege of the US embassy in Tehran which lasted from the 4th of November 1979 to January 20, 1981, the very day of the swearing-in of incoming President Ronald Reagan. It would really help normalizing the relationship between the arch-enemies. The expected festivities (I am afraid, well-organized mass demonstrations) on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution (in February) and later the upcoming presidential election campaign in Iran might prevent mutual gestures of good-will. But we’ll see. 

 

Not Inevitable

January 24, 2009

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Only one day after his inauguration, President Barack Obama got already some good advice on how to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue from ISIS, David Albright’s  Institute for Scientific and International Security, providing essential background information and recommendations to the public and the new administration. It paints once more a gloomy picture of Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions and clandestine uranium enrichment program. Albright and Jacqueline Shire (together with Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel) even expect that “[T]he year 2009 will likely mark Iran’s development of a nuclear weapons capability.” However, once again, the report does neither consider the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran nor Iran’s claims that its nuclear program serves entirely peaceful purposes.

 

A Road Map

In order to prevent Iran from going ahead with its enrichment program, Albright et al. see a road map (right now, a rather discredited term) in (i) further increased sanctions (which, so far, had only limited effect, to say the least; the current global financial crisis will have a greater impact on any economy, including that in the U.S. than any sanctions); (ii) hold immediate (!) direct talks (indeed overdue; but right now, who should be addressed? Due to the presidential elections in Iran later this year any talks have to be considered as part of the upcoming campaign); (iii) recommitting to incentive package offered by the European Union in June 2008 (without confidence-building measures it would be an illusion that Iran will respond as desired); (iv) urging Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) (in fact the most important task for the Obama administration. In return, the nuclear issue should then be referred back from the United Nations Security Council to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a position Iran holds since it had withdrawn its signature under the Additional Protocol early in 2006); (v) building diplomatic relations between the U.S and Iran (overdue as well. Former President George W. Bush may have conducted another grave mistake when leaving that to his successor); (vi) engaging Russia and China (Albright et al. clearly see the former obstacle here in the failed presidency of Bush); (vii) supporting regional arms control and security arrangements (a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East must include Israel, which is not even mentioned by Albright et al.); (viii) establishing regional constraints on nuclear energy (why should it be only regional? Nuclear energy will definitely not solve but create serious problems in the future. Its technology should be abandoned by all governments); and finally (ix) opposing a military solution (it is hoped that Israel is carefully reading that issue, too).

 

Circular Reasoning

But let’s have a look at the reasoning in the report. How far has Iran come in its enrichment activities? Albright et al. mention that, since early 2007 when the underground centrifuges in Natanz had been activated (presently, more than 5000 P1 centrifuges are rotating, and Iran plans to install a total of 15’000 in the near future), Iran has yielded a total of 630 kilograms of low enriched uranium hexafluoride (LEU). In order to fuel the soon finished reactor in Bushehr, it would need to produce about 37 tons (!) of LEU. The only reason for Iran to carry on with the program is, according to Albright et al., that it’s seeking to establish the capability of producing enough weapon-grade uranium. With almost 6000 centrifuges operating at current levels, Iran could easily produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) for one or two nuclear bombs a year.

 

Although circular reasoning, of course, this argument is worth a second thought. Iran has already started, as Albright et al. point out, developing next generation centrifuges (IR-2 and IR-3) and significant stocks of uranium hexafluoride. Altogether, Iran has already produced about 350 tons of uranium, according to Albright et al. enough for over 35 nuclear weapons. All of it is safeguarded by the IAEA.

 

Evidence or Speculation

While (according to Albright et al., the unclassified portion of) the NIE in December 2007 stated with “high confidence” that Iran had been working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons, but Tehran halted the program in fall 2003, the IAEA published in May 2008 ‘troubling’ activities on developing and “testing a ‘hemisperical, converging, explosively driven shock system’ applicable to an implosion-type nuclear device” and documents that show that Iran has worked on the “redesign of the inner cone of the Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle to accommodate a nuclear warhead.” According to IAEA, these illicit activities date into early 2004. Apart from not contradicting in general the NIE, Iran has insisted repeatedly that these documents had been forged, and denies ever having undertaken any nuclear weapons-related research. Since 2003, there is in fact “far less” (according to Albright et al., public) evidence about renewed nuclear weaponization activities of Iran. Since ongoing weaponization work would be considered a ‘smoking gun’, which would significantly erode Iran’s support worldwide (is there any? one is tempted to ask), Albright et al. speculates that “[I]ran has tightened its security over these efforts.” A further discussion and circular reasoning of this kind about intelligence and Iran’s denial, as once again started by Albright et al. in this paper, should be considered useless unless the long awaited new National Intelligence Estimate is made available to the public. Albright et al. speculate a lot about a ‘break-out’ capability of Iran. They write: “Under a wide variety of scenarios, Iran is moving steadily toward a break-out capability and is expected to reach that milestone during the first half of 2009.” Albright et al. argue that LEU may quickly be fueled into the centrifuges to produce weapon-grade highly-enriched uranium. They disregard the obvious high risk of the leaders for the country of being immediately attacked by, for instance, Israel and the U.S. once it leaves the nuclear NPT and diverts LEU.

 

What about Israel?

In order to build confidence in the international community Tehran has to implement once again the Additional Protocol of the NPT. Iran must indeed prove that it is not clandestinely working on a military project of developing nuclear weapons. In return, the nuclear issue should be referred from the UN Security Council back to the IAEA. These acts should be accomplished as soon as possible. The upcoming presidential elections in Iran will, of course, create some hurdles for the new Obama administration and Tehran, as well. It is unfortunate and negligent that this ISIS report does not explicitly call Israel for eventually signing the NPT and allowing the IAEA to investigate its nuclear activities. The whole Middle East must sooner or later be nuclear-free.  

 

 

Legacy

January 18, 2009

Documented civilian deaths from violence according to Iraq Body Count.

90,329 – 98,605

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Civilian death toll in Iraq dramatically decreased during the year 2008. Fortunately, the expected overt civil war did not break out in Iraq. Anyway, I have especially expressed my disgust  for several female or even teenage suicide bombings on the occasion of Shi’a festivals here on this blog.

President G. W. Bush’s legacy will be a burden not only for his successor in the White House. His initial statement ‘mission accomplished’  has been attenuated to ‘term accomplished’ with most if not all questions left unanswered and new problems, in particular with Iran’s role in the region, emerging. The proxy war in Gaza insufficiently conceals that the  arch enemies Israel and Iran have lined-up already for new military conflicts in the near future. Coming-in President Barack Obama will have to learn that regional powers may not be kept under control by drastically economically weakened United States which have completely lost their moral reputation (if they ever had it) in the Middle East. 

But that might be a chance as well. Obama may set the stage for confidence-building measures by quickly declaring the end of the ‘War on Terror’, even before closing down Guantanamo Bay. International collaboration and diplomacy even with Iran and Syria is overdue after years of solo actions of the previous US administration and attempts to force allies into ‘coalitions of the willing’. Due to his background, Obama might have much more intercultural competence and an open, not restricted and fundamentalistic, mind as regards to cultural and religious matters.

It is clear that Israel’s new war in Gaza is intended to quickly set the scene in order to prevent Obama from starting his diplomatic initiative. Let’s see what his first steps will be next week.

Esfahan’s Old City

January 17, 2009

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As ever, a visitor of the city of Esfahan is immensely impressed of the Safavid ensemble of the Meydan-e Shah, or how it is also called, the Naqsh-e Jahan (literally, a drawing of the World). The huge square, which is 512 meters long and 163 meters wide, must in fact be praised as one of the most beautiful in the world. There is nothing comparable to the two mosques in their spatial relationship to the Shah’s Ali Qapoo palace, the entrance of the Great bazaar on the other end and hundreds of arches, arcades and shops surrounding the site. It is said that the whole square hasn’t changed much since its creation under Sha Abbas the Great’s reign. As an outstanding example, the stunning façade of the extremely elegant Masjed-e Sheikh Lutfallah, the private mosque of the Shah’s womenfolk, has now been reproduced countless times as an outstanding example of subtle and colorful decoration of 17th century Persian buildings’ outer surfaces. But as a matter of fact, the whole façade is a restoration after World War II.

 

When planning his new royal city, Abbas I avoided interfering with the old city’s fabric. The former Seljuq capital is located around Esfahan’s Masjed-e Jomeh. The two sites, the Meydan-e Shah and the Great Mosque, were connected by an about one mile long path through the main bazaar. In fact, the ‘medieval’ quarters [1] there and to the west and east of Masjed-e Jomeh continued to enlarge during the Safavid period. From an architectural point of view, the old quarters of Esfahan are as significant for visitors as Naqsh-e Jahan. But little has left in recent decades. Already before World War II, modernization of all Iranian cities took its toll. The need for automobile access resulted usually in cutting the old city center by an arbitrary straight road passing near the Friday mosque [2]. Another road is cut more or less perpendicular to the first one forming a square when intersecting with the former.

 

Traditional, or ancient, Islamic settlements differ in many aspects from, for instance, villages, towns and cities in the West. Clusters of dwellings are assembled and build an organic fabric together with mosques, caravanserais, shops and workshops in the bazaar [3]. The fundamental unit, almost an urban island, is usually grouped around a narrow blind alley. These units comprise usually several houses forming a ring of little lanes which are bordered by high mud walls preventing any insight into the dwellings. In a house, a central courtyard, often sunken and with trees and flower beds, is surrounded by the rooms for the different purposes, receiving guests, eating and cooking, sleeping [4]. In Esfahan’s old city, these units, i.e., clusters of dwellings, can still sometimes be seen, although most of the houses have been replaced by new building during the last decades. The city is still functioning, however. At least, the people are living there. On the other hand, old quarters in many other cities are abandoned, dead and museum-like for visitors, and definitely doomed to further decay [5]. More information about earlier efforts (before the Islamic Revolution) of a rehabilitation of the old quarters in Esfahan can be found in Nasrine Faghih’s article [6].

 

                                                                                 

 

Notes

 

[1] From a Eurocentric point of view, ‘medieval’ designates a century-long dark age with little progress in culture, science and civilization. There were no ‘middle ages’ in the Islamic world, of course. The constant development in science, art, and philosophy in Islamic countries had come to an end only during what is called Renaissance in Europe, the discovery of the Americas, European Enlightenment, and then colonialism and European imperialism. Sad to say that retardation of development, even stagnation, and fundamentalism have become consistent features of Islam for most of the 20th century.

 

[2] In the case of Esfahan, it is Khiaban-e Abdorrazzaq, one of numerous tree-lined avenues in the city. That it has brutally cut the old city’s paths can best be seen on aerial views, for instance in Henry Stierlin’s Islamic Art and Architecture, Thames and Hudson, London 2002, p. 214.

 

[3] One major building in Esfahan’s old city is the gorgeous Masjed-e Jomeh. Oleg Grabar has raised, in his lecture series and subsequent publication (Grabar O. The Great Mosque of Isfahan. New York University Press, New York 1992, p. 18), the question of whether the mosque, which seems not to have a defined border, was invading the city during the centuries or whether in fact the city absorbed the mosque. The interlocking of all aspects of daily life in an organic fabric is obvious here. Further information about the mosque can be found here.

 

[4] Recent attempts to use renovated old (‘traditional’) houses as hotels has to be considered very critical. One example near Hakim mosque has to be regarded an obvious failure, where a ‘traditional’ house was largely disfigured and decorated with uninspired paintings on the walls. Another house near Masjed-e Ali has preserved its hidden character, and the caring owner has put lots of effort in creating a harmonious environment. The final result leaves, however, mixed impressions.

 

[5] This is especially visible in, for instance, Kashan and Nain, where most people have moved now to the modern quarters of the cities. Similar developments can also be found in smaller towns or even villages, for example, Natanz.

 

[6] Nasrine Faghih (1976) Rehabilitation in Dardasht.  Architectural Review 1976; 159: 315-319.

 

 

See also on this blog

 

 

Islamic Geometric Patterns.  A nice booklet teaching you drawing incredibly difficult patterns with compass and straightedge.

 

The Mysterious North Dome of Esfahan’s Great Mosque. About the most significant mosque (from an architectural point of view) in Iran. Pictures can be found here and here.

 

Dazzling Tesselations. Presumed almost perfect Penrose patterns in medieval Esfahan which have attracted enormous interest in 2007 after a publication by Lu and Steinhardt in Science magazine.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ya Husayn

January 5, 2009

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Husayn ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib and his family left Madinah on the 4th of Rajab in the year 60 AH, and reached Makkah on the 4th of Shaban. They stayed there for some time, but they did not complete the hajj as they had pretended to do. Instead, on the 8th of Dhu’l Hijjah a small caravan set out to Kufa in Iraq, Ali’s former Capital. It was on a hopeless mission. The plot against Yazid, the infamous and so much hated Umayyad Caliph, Muawiya’s dissipated and incompetent son in Damascus, had been betrayed. When they reached the Euphrates, the ringleaders had been executed already. Husayn, his family and his men, not more than a few dozens, would have better been advised to surrender. The enemies’ army consisted of thousands. But the brave knights didn’t.

 

The battle on the banks of the Euphrates at Karbala, on the 10th of Muharram in the year 61 AH, the day of Ashura, didn’t take long. Although Husayn was wearing his grandfather’s cloak and took-up the Dhul’fiqar, Ali’s famous double-bladed sword, it didn’t help. He and all men of his army were killed, and women and children deported to Damascus. Yazid himself ordered the mutilation of Husayn’s body. His severed head was also carried to Damascus. His little daughter Ruqaiyyah, who was desperately asking for her father, was shown the head, and she died on the spot. Her shrine in the old city of Damascus is full of toys; she was only 5 years old when she died in a shock.

 

After the battle, Lady Zaynab, Husayn’s brave sister, became for a short while the leader of the Shi’at Ali and the guardian of the orphans of Ahl al-Bayt, the family of the Prophet. The heads of the martyrs and all womenfolk and children were sent to Yazid in Damascus. When Yazid was presented with Husayn’s head on a gold dish he started to poke his lips and teeth with a cane, to the disgust of a venerable companion. ‘Take your cane from those lips,’ he cried, ‘for by Allah, I have seen the lips of the Prophet (pbuh) kiss those lips!’

 

Lady Zaynab was later sent back to Madinah where she died the following year. Her shrine is in a mosque in the vicinity of Damascus. Another is in Cairo, Egypt. Some people assume her tomb in Madinah.

 

Wilfred Thesiger, an extremely knowledgeable British explorer who in fact lived with the people in the vicinity of the Holy Cities of Karbala and Najaf (the former Kufa) in Iraq, wrote in his famous book Marsh Arabs (1964) on page 53:

 

“Shiism had started as a political movement among the Arabs to advance the claims of Ali and his descendants to the Caliphate. But after the martyrdom of Husain, it established itself as a new religious movement and soon became especially powerful in Iraq and Persia, embodying the social discontent of the indigenous population with the Arab aristocracy. In time, Shiism split Islam as decisively as the Reformation devided the Catholic Church. Whereas the orthodox Sunnis recognize Ali as the fourth of the Caliphs, or successors to Muhammad, the Shias regard the first three Caliphs as usurpers. They believe in an apostolic succession of Imams who followed the Prophet. Most of them believe in twelve of these, of whom Ali, Hasan and Husain were the first three, the others being Husain’s descendants. According to the Shias, the last Imam was Muhammad al Mahdi who mysteriously disappeared at Samarra and whose return they await in the fullness of time as the Mahdi or Expected One.” 

 

The first 9 days of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic calendar, are dedicated to intense mourning in any Shi’a community, be it in Iran, Iraq, in the Emirates of the Gulf or in the Eastern regions of Saudi Arabia. The Ashura Festival on the 10th of Muharram commemorates the events of the Battle at Karbala and the Martyrdom of Husayn with vivid performances, processions, and a shocking brutality of self-flogging of young man and boys. If you won’t believe that there is a close, at least spiritual, relationship between Roman Katholic Church and Shi’a Islam, have a look at (very realistic if not real) crucifixion scenes on the Good Friday in the Philippines.

 

First published at Salmiya