Today’s announcement by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of the now rapid construction of a further ten uranium enrichment plants with up to 500’000 centrifuges (the locations of five had been decided already) definitely proves that Iran is seeking a network of enrichment plants which has been hidden to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so far and which completely contradicts claims that the Fordow site near Qom was the only site besides that at Natanz.

Despite new activities at its uranium mines, Iran’s many problems include, however, lack of uranium for enrichment. Since the proposed deal of outgoing IAEA Director General ElBaradei of swapping Iran’s low-enriched uranium (less than 4%) with some 20% enriched fuel from Russia and France for producing its urgently needed medical isotopes in its research reactor in Tehran seems to be dead, Iran may even see salvation in leaving the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, which would be a true disaster.

See a technical analysis of the Fordow enrichment plant here.

ElBaradei’s Legacy

November 28, 2009

Friday’s IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution, outgoing Director General (DG) Mohamed ElBaradei’s last working day at the Agency, is not intended to get Iran’s opaque nuclear program off with a slap on the wrist. It is much more serious for the country. The resolution of 25 of 35 member states voting for (and 3 against: Venezuela, Cuba and Malaysia) must be a clear signal to Iran. Nobel laureate ElBaradei, whose efforts in preventing another war in the Middle East while preserving professional integrity cannot be praised any more may actually be highly satisfied with the resolution. He might even acknowledge lack of trust and confidence on either side, but the vote clearly shows that Iran cannot interpret the NPT (with withdrawals of its additional protocols and modified Code 3.1 regulations at will) as it does.

Incoming DG Yukia Amani will face enormous problems with Iran right in the beginning of his term. The covert construction of the Fordow/Qom site for enriching uranium has been condemned in the resolution as illicit, and any speculation as to whether commencement of construction work has started before or after Iran’s withdrawal of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) modified Code 3.1 which requires member states to indicate new sites even at the time of planning is no longer regarded important. As Juan Cole sees it, Iran’s opaque nuclear program might seek a “breakout capability” whenever their rulers consider it necessary despite the Supreme Leaders’ claims that an atomic bomb is incompatible with Islam.  

But who is presently ruling the country? There are signs of serious power struggles within the complex oligarchy with both the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s and a due to a legitimacy crisis stricken President Ahmadinejad’s decline in influence. The opposition represented by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mir Hossein Mousavi (neither would be a trustworthy alternative to the present regime) and Mehdi Karroubi, not to talk about Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, has been silenced in recent weeks. Silenced by terror, in show trials, family threats, and on the streets. Even yesterday’s confiscation of 2003 Nobel Peace laureate Shirin Ebadi’s prize money may be an example.

Right now, the country can only be regarded a military dictatorship, or junta. The Revolutionary Guards, or pasdaran, have already taken control of Iran. Withdrawal from the NPT may only be the next logic step.

I was sitting in an airplane of Saudi Arabian Airline. It had turned out to be extremely difficult for me, the infidel, to get the visa for the, at least for foreigners, isolated country of Islam. Countless times I had to go to the Saudi Arabian consulate in Jabriah. I spent endless hours there and was usually treated in an unusual rude and impolite way. “The organizers will inform us if you are welcome!” I was told. “Come next week!” The organizers were the Saudi Arabian Association for Dental Research who had just started another attempt of organizing an annual meeting of the country’s dentists. Having lived and worked for a couple of years in Kuwait, I became more than curious to see whether they were interested in my research, too. Our Dean and my friend and colleague from Jordan wanted to accompany me. She also wanted to go to Makkah for Umrah, the lesser pilgrimage, but that was immediately declined by the authorities at the consulate. No way. Dhu al-Hijjah was coming soon, and the country was flooded with pilgrims from all over the world.

I was finally told that I was ‘welcome’. The organizers had even paid for the return ticket. My previous suggestion, going by car to Riyadh, was turned down and in fact considered ridiculously weird. “No way! Only families can drive by car in Saudi Arabia. You are a single!” And an infidel, but he didn’t speak out.

The glossy airline magazine had picked-out the upcoming holy month as the main issue, of course. Never, I read, had the air been so spiritually charged than when the Holy Prophet of Islam (s.a.w.) had decided to give his Farewell Sermon at Mount Arafat in the year 10 AH, after having conducted his first and final pilgrimage to Makkah and the Ka’aba. 114’000 Muslims, it is said, were listening to his words which had to be repeated sentence by sentence by his companion Rabiah who had a powerful voice. The sermon was as follows:

“All praise is due to Allah, so we praise Him, and seek His pardon and we turn to Him. We seek refuge with Allah from the evils of ourselves and from the evil consequences of our deeds. Whom Allah guides aright there is none to lead him astray; and there is none to guide him aright whom Allah leads astray. I bear witness that there is no God but Allah, the One, having no partner with Him. His is the sovereignty and to Him is due all praise. He grants life and causes death and is Powerful over everything. There is no God but Allah, the One; He fulfilled His promise and granted victory to His bondsman, and He alone routed the confederates (of the enemies of Islam).

O’ People! Listen to my words, for I do not know whether we shall ever meet again and perform Hajj after this year. O’ Ye people! Allah says, O’ people We created you from one male and one female and made you into tribes and nations, so as to be known to one another. Verily in the sight of Allah, the most honored amongst you is the one who is most God-fearing. There is no superiority for an Arab over a non-Arab and for a non-Arab over an Arab, nor for the white over the black nor for the black over the white except in God-consciousness’.

All mankind is the progeny of Adam and Adam was fashioned out of clay. Behold; every claim of privilege whether that of blood or property, is under my heels except that of the custody of the Ka’aba and supplying of water to the pilgrims, O’ people of Quraish, don’t appear (on the Day of Judgment) with the burden of this world around your necks, whereas other people may appear (before the Lord) with the rewards of the hereafter. In that case I shall avail you naught against Allah.

Behold! All practices of the days of ignorance are now under my feet. The blood revenges of the days of ignorance are remitted. The first claim on blood I abolish is that of Ibn Rabiah bin Harith who was nursed in the tribe of Sa’ad and whom the Hudhayls killed. All interest and usurious dues accruing from the times of ignorance stand wiped out. And the first amount of interest that I remit is that which Abbas ibn Abd-al Muttalib had to receive. Verily it is remitted entirely.

O’ people! Verily your blood, your property and your honor are sacred and inviolable until you appear before your Lord, as the sacred inviolability of this day of yours, this month of yours and this very town (of yours). Verily you will soon meet your Lord and you will be held answerable for your actions.

O’ people! Verily you have got certain rights over your women and your women have certain rights over you. It is your right upon them to honor their conjugal rights, and not to commit acts of impropriety, which if they do, you are authorized by Allah to separate them from your beds and chastise them, but not severely, and if they refrain, then clothe and feed them properly.

Behold! It is not permissible for a woman to give anything from the wealth of her husband to anyone but with his consent. Treat the women kindly, since they are your helpers and not in a position to manage their affairs themselves. Fear Allah concerning women, for verily you have taken them on the security of Allah and have made their persons lawful unto you by words of Allah.

O’ people! Allah, the Mighty and Exalted, has ordained to every one his due share (of inheritance). Hence there is no need (of special) testament for an heir (departing from the rules laid down by the Shari’ah). The child belongs to the marriage-bed and the violator of wedlock shall be stoned. And reckoning of their (deeds) rests with Allah. He who attributes his ancestry to other than his father or claims his clientship to other than his master, the curse of Allah is upon him.

All debts must be repaid, all borrowed property must be returned, gifts should be reciprocated and a surety must make good the loss to the assured. Beware! No one committing a crime is responsible for it but himself. Neither the child is responsible for the crime of his father, nor the father is responsible for the crime of his child.

Nothing of his brother is lawful for a Muslim except what he himself gives willingly. So do not wrong yourselves.

O’ People! Every Muslim is the brother of every other Muslim, and all the Muslims form one brotherhood. And your slaves; see that you feed them with such food as you eat yourselves, and clothe them with the clothes that you yourselves wear.

Take heed not to go astray after me and strike one another’s necks. He who (amongst you) has any trust with him, he must return it to its owner.

O’ people! Listen and obey, though a mangled Abyssinian slave is appointed your Amir, provided he executes (the Ordinance of) the Book of Allah among you.

O’ people! No Prophet would be raised after me and no new Ummah (would be formed) after you.

Verily I have left amongst you that which will never lead you astray, the Book of Allah, which if you hold fast you shall never go astray.

And beware of transgressing the limits set in the matters of religion, for it is transgression of (the proper bounds of) religion that brought destruction to many people before you.

Verily, the Satan is disappointed at ever being worshipped in this land of yours, but he will be pleased by obedience in anything (short of worship that is) in matters you may be disposed to think insignificant, so beware of him in your matters of religion.

Behold! Worship your Lord; offer prayers five times a day; observe fast in the month of Ramadhaan; pay readily the Zakat (poor due) on your property; and perform pilgrimage to the House of God and obey your rulers and you will be admitted to the Paradise of your Lord.
Let him that is present, convey it unto him who is absent, for many people to whom the message is conveyed may be more mindful of it than the audience.

And if you were asked about me, what would you say?”
They answered, “We bear witness that you have conveyed the trust (of religion) and discharged your ministry of Prophethood and looked to our welfare.”

Toward the end of his sermon, the Prophet asked “O people, have I faithfully delivered unto you my message?” A powerful murmur of assent “O Allah, yes!” arose from thousands of pilgrims and the vibrant words “Allahumma na’m” rolled like thunder throughout the valley. Thereupon Allah’s Messenger (s.a.w.) lifted his forefinger towards the sky and then pointing towards people said:

“O’ Lord: Bear Thou witness unto it.
O’ Lord: Bear Thou witness unto it.”

We landed in Riyadh, and a driver had already been waiting for us. He immediately realized that my female friend had been traveling without her husband. Thus, it was considered impossible that she had to take a taxi from her hotel to the conference hotel every morning. Without further ado she was ‘kidnapped’ and brought to the conference venue where she had to stay. I didn’t see her again during these days, only later after having safely returned to Kuwait. One reason for that was also the large black cloth which separated the ladies’ from the gents’ sides in the main auditorium. The latter was not illuminated and even from the podium not visible. I gratefully noticed that one female colleague was courageous enough to insist asking a more intelligent question after my presentation, and the chairman indignantly permitted her inquiry.

We left the country before Dhu al-Hijjah had commenced. The authorities wanted the numerous infidels who had been invited for guest speeches out of the country before the millions of pilgrims would arrive.

Coming back to the Last Sermon of the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) I immediately had to think of the Sermon on the Mount delivered by Jesus (p.b.u.h.) as it is described in the Gospel of Matthew (5-7). There is, of course, a big difference, in particular as regards the revolutionary ethics of the latter. Read, for example, about the love for enemies (Matt 5: 43-48):

43 “You have heard that it was said: ‘Love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’
44 But I tell you: Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you,
45 That you may be sons of your Father in heaven. He causes His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous.
46 If you love those who love you, what reward will you get? Are not even the tax collectors doing that?
47 And if you greet only your brothers, what are you doing more than others? Do not even pagans do that?
48 Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect.”

Can there be a better motto for the upcoming holiday season for both Christians and Muslims? For all my Muslim friends and colleagues, blessed and most spiritual holidays! Eid Mubarak!

First published at Salmiya.

Bad Kunduz

November 26, 2009

Until recently the Germans called Kunduz in the northeast of Afghanistan a spa (“Bad Kunduz”). The war was not called a war and partying in the camp common. Much has changed after two petrol road tankers had been hijacked by Taliban insurgents in Ramadan, the Muslim holy month of fasting. It was Thursday September 3, a weekend, and German Colonel Georg Klein and his staff sergeant (code name “Red Baron”) had ordered American F15 Strike Eagles  to bombard the fuel tankers which had got stuck in a sand bank of the Kunduz River. They dropped two 500 lb bombs and up to 142 people, including some 30 civilians, died in an inferno.

What has been always very disturbing was that the Sergeant had actually been asked by the pilots (code names “Dudes 15 and 16”) whether a “show of force” would be sufficient and whether the individuals seen in the vicinity of the fuel tanks comprised an “imminent threat.” The negative responses given by the “Red Baron”, however, led to the release of the two bombs at 1.50 am local time, Friday morning. A pretty graphic, so far classified, movie made by the pilots and showing the situation on the sand bank with numerous people around the fuel tanks and the subsequent blast had been published today by German leading tabloid BILD. It was also reported that severely injured minors had been transported to local hospitals.


Despite having immediately known about civilian casualties, former German Secretary of Defense Franz Josef Jung had insisted for several days months after the disaster that only Taliban had been killed and the call for the bombers justified. His successor in office, Baron Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg has fired today German Army’s Chief of Staff General Wolfgang Schneiderhan and Under-Secretary of State Peter Wichert.

Thus, pawns are being sacrificed, but Jung, who is presently Secretary of Labor in Angela Merkel’s new Cabinet, will certainly be dismissed soon as well, while his Colonel Klein is probably facing a lawsuit.

 

See also on this blog:

Mobile Phone?

Not another Surge

November 24, 2009

President Obama’s decision on a new strategy for Afghanistan will come after Thanksgiving Day, i.e., early next week. There is fear that it will be merely about 10’000, 20’000, or 40’000 additional troops. Some would rather advice the Nobel Peace Price winner of 2009 to fire his generals, first and foremost Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus. New troops will not solve the problems of the country which is constantly at war for 30 years.

What had begun eight years ago as a retaliation operation towards caves in Tora Bora from where Osama bin Laden supposedly had orchestrated the attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon has lost its justification for a long time. Aims and scopes of the war have vanished as well. The Taliban, insurgents without face or name, have become the adversaries in an asymmetric war with increasing numbers of civilian casualties and a high death toll among U.S. troops and allies.

Getting out of Afghanistan as soon as possible will be the only way of bringing it to an end. That is what Obama had promised, nothing else. After Vietnam, the U.S. has to learn a second time that defeat is inevitable.

What will come afterwards? We don’t know. But we should admit: It’s not really our business. That new terror attacks are plotted in Afghanistan is unlikely. Pakistan is the greater risk. We have to wait and see whether the Afghan people can prevent the re-emergence of a cruel Taliban dictatorship. At last, it is their country. Sure, democratic structures (if there are any) are different. But the uncritical support for the corrupt “Mayor of Kabul” Hamid Karzai was counterproductive anyway. The promised “change” would have looked different.

It is hoped that, after an orderly retreat of all troops, finally peace (!) will gradually gear the necessary beneficial developments.

See also on this blog: Ramadan in Afghanistan

Outgoing Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei had given New York Times an interview earlier this month where he had talked about the new uranium enrichment site at Fordow near Qom, which has been revealed to the public in September, as just a “hole in the mountain”. When U.N. inspectors visited the site on October 26 and 27, they had allegedly found “nothing to be worried about”. “The idea was to use it as a bunker under the mountain to protect things.”

The main question remains, however, why and when Iran had started construction work at Fordow. The latest IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear activities is more explicit:

“12. Iran explained that the Fordow site had been allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in the second half of 2007, and that that was when the construction of the FFEP (Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant) had started. Iran subsequently confirmed that explanation in a letter dated 28 October 2009. In that letter, Iran stated that:

“As a result of the augmentation of the threats of military attacks against Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran decided to establish contingency centers(!) for various organizations and activities …

“The Natanz Enrichment Plant was among the targets threatened with military attacks. Therefore, the Atomic Energy Organization requested the Passive Defence Organization to allocate one of those aforementioned centers for the purpose of [a] contingency enrichment plant, so that enrichment activities shall not be suspended in the case of any military attack. In this respect, the Fordow site, being one of those constructed and prepared centers, [was] allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in the second half of 2007. The construction of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant sten started. The construction is still ongoing. Thus the plant is not yet ready for operation and it is planned to be operational in 2011.”

13. During the meetings, the Agency informed Iran that it had acquired commercially available satellite imagery of the site indicating that there had been construction at the site between 2002 and 2004, and that construction activities were resumed in 2006 and had continued to date. The Agency also referred to the extensive information given to the Agency by a number of Member States detailing the design of the facility, which was consistent with the design as verified by the Agency during the DIV (Design Information Verification). The Agency also informed Iran that these Member States alleged that design work on the facility had started in 2006.”

Thus, Iran admits that it has considered a number of possible contingency centers in case the Natanz facility is being attacked. How many of them have not been declared yet? Iran’s notification of the Fordow sites came only after it had become clear for Tehran that intelligence agencies had come to know of the site for some time.

Satellite imagery published earlier this month by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) has narrowed the time frame during which Iran would have begun construction work at the site to after January 2006 but before June 2007. Iran is clearly contradicting this evidence here. The question might be of importance when considering the modified Code 3.1 of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) under which Iran is obliged to immediately inform the IAEA about a possible nuclear facility at the time of planning. Iran has suspended its compliance with early notification rules in March 2007. Its majlis, or parliament, has never ratified Code 3.1. Nevertheless, the IAEA stresses (under 17.) that “Iran remains bound by the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to which it had agreed in 2003, which requires that the Agency be provided with preliminary design information about a new nuclear facility as soon as the decision to construct or to authorize constructiob of the facility is taken.”

The IAEA report further states:

“16. Iran stated that it did not have any other nuclear facilities that were currently under construction or in operation that had not yet been declared to the Agency. Iran also stated that any such future facilities would “be reported to the Agency according to Iran’s obligations to the Agency”. In a letter dated 6 November 2009, the Agency asked Iran to confirm that it had not taken a decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which had not been declared to the Agency.”

Thus, the report clearly underlines Iran’s violation of its obligations under the NPT as regards the new enrichment facility near Qom. And it is not a ‘hole in the mountain’. The report’s detailed description gives a completely different picture:

“10. The DIV included a detailed visual examination of all areas of the plant, the taking of photographs of cascade piping and other process equipment, the taking of environmental samples and a detailed assessment of the design, configuration and capacity of the various plant components and systems. Iran provided access to all areas of the facility. The Agency confirmed that the plant corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced(!) stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility. Centrifuge mounting pads, header and sub-header pipes, water piping, electrical cables and cabinets had been put in place but were not yet connected; the passivation tanks, chemical traps, cold traps and cool boxes were also in place but had not been connected. In addition, a utilities building containing electricity transformers and water chillers had also been erected.”

The report concludes that “Iran’s failure to inform the Agency, in accordance with the provisions of the revised Code 3.1, of the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility as soon as such a decision is taken, and to submit information as the design is developed, is inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguard Agreement. Moreover, Iran’s delay in submitting such information to the Agency does not contribute to the building of confidence.”

Joshua Pollock at ArmsControlWonk.com has pointed today to a lecture by Thomas Fingar, former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, which was given at Stanford University on October 21 where he provides insights as to how the Intelligence Community, by declassifying minor parts of the classified 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (NIE) may have manipulated lawmakers for the sake of drawing the ‘right’ conclusions and act accordingly.

It comes somehow as a surprise (even for Pollock) that “the White House [had] instructed the Intelligence Community to release an unclassified version of the report’s key judgments but declined to take responsibility for ordering its release.” (Emphasis added.)

“Critics on the right and the left denounced or praised the report as a deliberate effort by the Intelligence Community – or, in many of the commentaries, by me – to derail administration plans to attack Iran. That, too, is a story for another day.

“What I want to do here is to take advantage of the fact that a small portion of the estimate was declassified (3 of about 100 pages with none of the almost 1500 source citations) making it possible for me to talk about it in public.”

But an attack of Iran in late 2007 had been imminent. Seymour Hersh has had reported already one year before on the results of C.I.A. activities which were perceived in the White House with hostility. He wrote in The New Yorker on November 27, 2006:

“The Administration’s planning for a military attack on Iran was made far more complicated earlier this fall by a highly classified draft assessment by the C.I.A. challenging the White House’s assumptions about how close Iran might be to building a nuclear bomb. The C.I.A. found no conclusive evidence, as yet, of a secret Iranian nuclear-weapons program running parallel to the civilian operations that Iran has declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency. (The C.I.A. declined to comment on this story.)

“The C.I.A.’s analysis, which has been circulated to other agencies for comment, was based on technical intelligence collected by overhead satellites, and on other empirical evidence, such as measurements of the radioactivity of water samples and smoke plumes from factories and power plants. Additional data have been gathered, intelligence sources told me, by high-tech (and highly classified) radioactivity-detection devices that clandestine American and Israeli agents placed near suspected nuclear-weapons facilities inside Iran in the past year or so. No significant amounts of radioactivity were found.

“A current senior intelligence official confirmed the existence of the C.I.A. analysis, and told me that the White House had been hostile to it.”

It has also been reported that Vice President Dick Cheney had been outrageous when parts of the 2007 NIE were actually declassified and the public learned that Iranian had, with some confidence, not resumed their military nuclear program since 2003.

Most commentators intuitively understood the NIE’s main message that, if Iran had once found it reasonable, under its ‘reform’ president Mohammad Khatami, to halt, in response to international pressure, an existing, nuclear weapons program, diplomacy was still a valid option in 2007. In addition Fingar, in his lecture, makes the point that the NIE had also the timeline in mind, as to when Iran resumes, if it wants, the fabrication of a nuclear weapon. In the NIE, that date had been moved from late 2009 to “sometime during the 2010-2015 timeframe.” (In an updated testimony to Congress, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair has further postponed the date to “not before 2013.”)

“The declassified portion of the (2007) estimate did not address how long it would take Iran to convert highly enriched uranium into a weapon but the classified text did.”

Who will get the classified version of intelligence information, which might lead to war, and who (lawmakers, the public) is put off with the declassified part is a sensitive issue. The declassified part of the 2007 NIE on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities has, so far, at least prevented another war in the Middle East with most probably disastrous consequences not only for the region which, as everybody knows, is a tinderbox. In that context, those who have decided to release it might have deserved the Nobel Peace Prize more than anybody else.

Fingar closes with an either naïve or cynical, anyway irrational, confidence of serving the good guys in a complicated world, beyond any democracy.

“How those judgments (in the NIE’s declassified portion) could be construed as dismissing the idea that Iranian nuclear activities were a major problem continues to mystify me, but the point I want to make here is that, in addition to many other things, the NIE gave policymakers a timeline, a sense of urgency, and possible alternative ways to address the problem. We were helping them to anticipate and shape the future.”

The Same Old Tricks

November 1, 2009

The widely perceived new crisis about Iran’s nuclear program has a pretty complicated history. Several Iranian lawmakers and even defeated presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi have vehemently rejected a UN brokered deal according to which Iran should send 1200 kg of its low enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia for further enrichment and later to France for refinement.

In order to produce radio isotopes for medical purposes, such as Technetium-99m, medium enriched uranium has been fuelled into the 5 MW research reactor in Tehran for years, which has been supplied by the United States more than 40 years ago. Iran had purchased in 1988 about 116 kg of medium enriched uranium at 19.75% from Argentina, and this amount has been delivered to Iran by 1993. According to some calculations Iran would be running out this fuel by late 2010. Early in June 2009, Iran’s envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Ali-Asgar Soltaniyeh had sent an inquiry to outgoing Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei seeking to replace this supply.

Soltaniyeh’s letter to the IAEA of June 2 has obviously extensively been discussed in the October 1 Geneva talks by the P5+1 and Iran, both in plenary sessions and face-to-face talks. At least the Iranian delegation led by its chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili seemed to have accepted that most of its LEU stockpile would be send to Russia for further enrichment after which France would provide Iran with the refined fuel.

The Geneva talks have been described as largely open, professional, even constructive. That the U.S. and Iran achieved almost a deal in an allegedly first encounter since the 444-day American Embassy hostage crisis of 1979-1981 (which will be commemorated next week on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean with contradictory sentiments) was a true sensation. But one cannot disregard the current legitimacy crisis of Iran’s leaders after the catastrophic presidential election only four months ago; and the ever diverging opinions among the establishment. Tehran has definitely a couple of other options for consideration.

First, the country could enrich its so far produced LEU by simply reintroducing it into the centrifuges in Natanz. Soltaniyeh’s inquiry letter to ElBaradei contained most probably already such a suggestion, although even Tehran would consider it unrealistic that the IAEA would allow the country to step up their enrichment program for medical purposes. Most countries are already afraid of Iran’s enrichment program resulting possibly in a nuclear bomb. There have also been reports on contamination problems of the so far produced LEU with molybdenum hexafluoride which might put the centrifuges in Natanz at risk if used for further enrichment. However, while so far the country has failed in certain areas, it definitely tries hard to master the full nuclear cycle. These kinds of technical problems may indeed be solved soon.

Second, under the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Iran is a signatory of since 1968, the country has actually the right to simply buy the stuff for medical reasons even under current UNSC resolution 1737.

And third, Iran may even reconsider its inquiry and shut down for the time being the more than 40 years old research reactor in Tehran after running out the Argentine medium enriched uranium. Tehran may consider producing radio isotopes for medical purposes easier and in much larger amounts in the heavy water reactor at Arak which might be operational soon.

In fact, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA Ali-Asgar Soltaniyeh went to the Vienna talks which started on October 19 not with one, apparently unprofitable, option for Iran only; namely sending almost all LEU abroad. Given the bad reputation of French negotiators in nuclear issues in particular when it comes to Iran, all of the above three alternatives may have discussed already then. Why ElBaradei so much hurried with his deal which would put Iran in a position where it could easily be blackmailed by western powers may have something to do with his soon retirement. But Iran has got some experience in recent decades of not being fleeced at the end of the day.

It has certainly been a ‘golden opportunity’ of getting rid of Iran’s nuclear stuff, but the French, American and Russian delegation has not really succeeded in confidence building. It is hoped anyway that the talks will continue on a par with Iran.

Visiting Qom

October 26, 2009

Jan2009_2

 

 

Inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are now visiting the recently disclosed new uranium enrichment facility near Qom in Iran. Some commentators have raised concern that Iran would have had more than a month, after having notified the IAEA on September 21 about the site, to remove any incriminating evidence that the site has already been in an advanced stage of construction.  

Iran’s disclosure of the site came only after it had become clear that western intelligence had got knowledge about it for some time. GlobalSecurity.org  has published satellite imagery of January 2009 by DigitalGlobal which shows somehow disturbing construction work of an apparently heavily fortified facility already done. The UN inspectors will soon report on their findings to the IAEA headquarters in Vienna. ElBaradei’s next and probably final report on Iran (he will retire in December) is due next month.

qom-dg-2009jan00-image5

Dealing with Iran

October 24, 2009

Chess

 

 

Earlier this month Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and his delegation had suggested, in the long-awaited Geneva talks, an unexpected deal with the West regarding shipping much of its so far produced stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia for further enrichment to about 20%. It should then been returned to Iran in order to fuel Tehran’s research reactor for the production of medical isotopes. Many commentators were just surprised about completely new perspectives of international collaboration with the decade-long isolated pariah state. Possible motivations for Tehran’s seemingly constructive turn were quickly analyzed. Severe contamination of LEU, which had been produced in Natanz, with molybdenum had been identified as a major problem for further uranium enrichment at that site. But if Iran actually wants to master the full nuclear fuel cycle, reprocessing LEU in Esfahan’s uranium conversion facility should not be regarded a serious obstacle.

After further talks at the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Iran has missed in the meantime a deadline, set by the outgoing IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, of responding to a proposal which suggested that most of Iran’s LEU is exported to Russia and France. The issue is delicate, and Ali Ashgar Soltaniyeh, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, has definitely to get approval in Tehran which has signaled already that the country prefers to simply purchase the needed uranium for the research reactor from Russia. Soltaniyeh has promised to provide the IAEA with a final answer next week.

There are definitely heavy disputes within the complicated ruling hierarchy, in particular when considering the tremendous emphasis the possibly illegitimate President Ahmadinejad has given to Iran’s nuclear program in the past, which has allegedly only peaceful purposes. The proposed UN deal which has been agreed already by the US, France and Russia may there be regarded as lopsided debilitation of Tehran’s position; and a hastily set deadline by ElBaradei might have been a grave diplomatic mistake, indeed. Iranian delegations are usually competent chess players who easily rumble intentions of their western counterparts.

At the same time, IAEA inspectors are right now underway for a visit of the newly disclosed enrichment site near Qom which has been revealed to the public only last month, first in a letter by Iran to the IAEA dated September 21 and a couple of days later during a press conference by President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Gordon Brown and President Nicolas Sarkozy in Pittsburgh at the G20 meeting. It is not clear whether the past few weeks had enabled Iran to remove revealing evidence that the site has already been operational. Some commentators have pitied that the West has not insisted on immediate inspections after the site had been made public.

There is fear that mutual trust and confidence building has come to an end already. Iran’s illegitimate government, in particular its hard-line president, may be in need of keeping the country in its pariah state, sad to say.